suspicion, secularism, and the turkish military

so blogging intelligently is much more difficult than writing travel anecdotes...
so that i don't completely lose whatever audience i might have, i'd like to post a handful of thoughts surrounding a couple interviews/news pieces that i've been trying to think about together. i suppose that i don't have to have an outstanding thesis every time i post something, so here goes.

the initial impetus for my trying a different kind of blog came from a conversation i had with some friends on a rooftop in brooklyn the night before i flew to istanbul. the conversation focused on the recent resignation of the top 4 turkish military officials. so a few english language articles later and a few turkish lessons to read a hürriyet article or two about it, i feel compelled to focus on this as a first in depth topic.

the question of the military in turkey has long fascinated me. when the republic of turkey was founded out of the ashes of the ottoman empire by atatürk, it was first and foremost a military operation. atatürk, himself a military commander of repute, along with a cadre of others, again many from a military background, left istanbul and began operations in the heart of anatolia. the war of independence, fought mostly against the greeks, resulted in the founding of the republic of turkey mostly by a group of military men. and, if you've had a conversation with me, you know that this republic was founded on staunch secular ideals. at the same time, atatürk removed his military uniform to enact a separation between the military and the government, such that active officers were not to be elected officials.

and this is where it gets blurry for me. i would love someone with more complete knowledge to fill me in here. either that or there is still a really interesting book to be written (in my online research i just came across william hale's turkish politics and the military- time to head to homer's bookstore). somewhere between atatürk's separation of the military and elected officials and his staunch secularism, presumably sometime after his death, the military took on a role not only of an outside 'check' on the government, but even more specifically as defenders of secularism. thus the first turkish military coup in 1960 should be characterized as a response to "undemocratic" measures by the menderes government (Turkey after Atatürk). likewise, the 1971 coup was a response to the violent situation in turkey where left and right-wing groups robbed banks, assassinated professors, and shot each other in the street. likewise with the 1980 coup. nonetheless, both of these coups were justified in part by the fact that many of the fractious parties involved in the violent situation were religious in nature. thus, the tradition of kemalist secularism was invoked as partial justification for the coup. finally, the 1997, so-called "postmodern coup" which pressured the resignation of prime minister erbakan, perhaps most explicitly invoked secularism. a quote translated on the wikipedia page for the "postmodern coup":
Çevik Bir, one of the generals who planned the process said that “In Turkey we have a marriage of Islam and democracy. (…) The child of this marriage is secularism. Now this child gets sick from time to time. The Turkish Armed Forces is the doctor which saves the child. Depending on how sick the kid is, we administer the necessary medicine to make sure the child recuperates.”

which leads us to the recent events of the resignation of the four top turkish generals. al-jazeera's "inside story" did a great roundtable on the story, which i find a great introduction to this specific event: Turkey: A new political era?
a translation from the newspaper 'vatan' gives the statement of the chief of general staff:
General Kosaner's farewell message criticized the government:
"Currently, 173 active and 77 retired, a total of 250 generals/admirals, officers, non-commissioned officers and special sergeants are behind bars in contravention of justice and conscientious values. 14 generals/admirals and 58 colonels have lost their rights to be assessed at this year's Supreme Military Council and they have been punished in advance although they are not convicted.
"Investigations and long detention times are kept on the agenda to create an image that Turkish Armed Forces is a crime organization. Government has not made efforts enough to stop it. I will not be able to continue as Chief of General Staff as I have been impeded by this situation to protect rights of my staff." (a page of translated news reviews of the resignation and aftermath).

i won't try to get into the convoluted ergenekon and sledgehammer plots and trials. the very basic is that there have been a series of arrests based on suspected coup attempts. these are the arrests to which general kosaner is referring. likewise, the end of the 'inside story' above gives some basics about the cases.

this post turned mostly into a background and hopefully a collection of resources in one place to think about this event. i'd like to end by bringing in a recent interview with talal asad on the ssrc (social science research council) website. in the interview, asad discusses the role of suspicion in the revolution in egypt. taken in concert with the ergenekon and sledgehammer arrests as discussed during 'inside story,' i'd like to end thinking about the proliferation of suspicion around the coups and the turkish military. asad mentions earlier work concerning the danish cartoon controversy, where he interrogates our assumptions about freedom of speech in relation some of kind of perceived islamic or religious threat (see 'is critique secular.' the discussion on the ssrc blog does not include much of asad's essay which ended up in the volume).
so the questions i will end with relate to this idea that there is seemingly much more willingness to exercise criticism and the freedom of speech in the face of religious conviction rather than other cases. can we characterize the suspicion surrounding the possible coups and military intervention as a response to the use of explicitly secular criticism by the military? that is, are we witnessing a kind of suspicion which proliferates in the face of secular criticism which asad highlights? when confronted with the clear choice to exercise freedom of expression only in some instances, directed towards some people's religious sensibilities and convictions, is suspicion on the part of the practitioner a 'defense mechanism' or part of a set of possible responses? with these questions, the recent move to amend article 35 could also be seen in this light, as another response tied up with suspicion. given the mass violence which preceded many of the coups, why was religion and the republic's secular character highlighted as justification for the coups? and does this selective use of religious/secular justification help fuel this suspicion?

a long post full of history, but i think i needed to collect many of these things into one place. i hope that some people will work through it. and i'd love to hear thoughts on my final paragraph and questions!